Putting Russian culture on hold? Case of dispositions within Lithuanian theatre1
Résumé
Cet article présente les résultats d’une recherche consacrée aux évolutions actuelles des attitudes envers la culture russe en Lituanie. La question au cœur de cette étude est de déterminer quelles sont, aujourd’hui, les dispositions des directeurs artistiques des théâtres dramatiques nationaux et d’État en Lituanie à l’égard de la diffusion de la culture russe. La recherche révèle un paysage théâtral lituanien en pleine renégociation de ses orientations culturelles. Le désengagement vis-à-vis de la diffusion de la culture russe n’est ni réactionnaire ni superficiel ; il reflète une position éthique consciente, façonnée par les réalités géopolitiques, un désir de rompre avec des schémas historiques de dépendance et une volonté d’aligner les pratiques artistiques sur des valeurs sociales plus larges. Ce moment témoigne d’une transformation significative – une transformation qui redéfinit la manière dont le théâtre lituanien conçoit son identité culturelle, ses responsabilités politiques et sa place dans un contexte régional en mutation.
Abstract
This article presents the findings of research dedicated to current developments in attitudes toward Russian culture in Lithuania. The research addresses the question of the present dispositions towards the dissemination of Russian culture among the artistic directors of national and state drama theatres in Lithuania. The research reveals a theatre landscape in Lithuania that is actively renegotiating its cultural alignments. The disengagement from dissemination of Russian culture is neither reactionary nor superficial; it reflects a conscious ethical position shaped by geopolitical realities, a desire to break from historical patterns of dependency, and a commitment to aligning artistic practices with broader social values. This moment reflects a significant transformation – one that redefines how Lithuanian theatre understands its cultural identity, its political responsibilities, and its place within a changing regional context.
Texte intégral
The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022. In an immediate reaction, the Ukrainian Institute, the leading institution for promoting Ukrainian culture abroad, affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, issued a call for the suspension of cultural cooperation with Russia and the international presentation of Russian culture. Addressing the global community, cultural institutions, individual professionals, the academic community, and civil society organisations in particular, the Institute urges them to refrain from presenting, performing, or promoting Russian culture and art until the war in Ukraine is over. In the Institutes' wording, such a choice is understood as a sign of “respect and grieve”2.
The global cultural community reacted very differently. The following two examples illustrate the scale of divergence. The first is the 2022-2023 season programme at the La Monnaie / De Munt opera house in Brussels. It included three Russian operas alongside other Russia-related projects and content, which provoked a public outcry and protests. In his statement, Peter de Caluwe, the general manager and artistic director at the time, argued that “The answer to war should be cultural cooperation, not cultural exclusion.“3. The second example is a still-active recommendation to the cultural sector, urging the temporary avoidance of all cooperation with Russian artists except those who openly criticize Vladimir Putin's regime, issued in 2022 by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Culture of Lithuania4. The Russian culture should be put into “mental quarantine”, yet the final choice is left to the cultural institutions, stated Simonas Kairys, the Minister of Culture at the time5. The disappearance of Russian content from Lithuanian cultural programming was noted by The New York Times. The journalists reflected the complex situation, where the primary debate on whether culture should be disentangled from politics was further complicated by the intertwined nature of Lithuanian and Russian cultures due to imperial and later Soviet occupations.6
This article presents the findings of research dedicated to current developments in attitudes toward Russian culture in Lithuania. The rationale of the research is grounded in two motives. The theatre is considered one of the most important forms of art in Lithuania in terms of communication and dissemination of cultural values. The second is that historically, Lithuanian theatre making was closely linked to Russia, with major artists being formed in imperial and later Soviet theatre schools until the 1990s. The research addresses the question of the present dispositions towards the dissemination of Russian culture among the artistic directors of national and state drama theatres in Lithuania.
The concept of soft power is essential to support the argument of this research. Joseph Nye defined the term in his 1990 book, Bound to Lead, and elaborated on it in numerous subsequent publications. Soft power is defined as the ability to achieve preferred outcomes by attraction rather than coercion or payment7. Soft power often involves the use of culture, political values, and foreign policies to shape the preferences, influence, or disrupt the political arrangements of others8. As a consequence of globalization and the interdependence of the nation states, which renders traditional power structures less efficient, the currency of soft power in world politics “has been gaining in importance and is likely to become even more crucial for years to come”9. Concurrently, Russia’s soft power is regarded as a substitute for limitations in its hard power, which is rooted in the legacy of military might and oil, yet cannot directly compete with the United States or other rivals. Its soft power can thus compensate for that weakness in international tensions10.
Art has the potential to change perspectives and raise awareness, contributing to socio-cultural change. It can inspire new social imaginaries and cultural mythologies, offering a more holistic approach to transformation compared to hard power11. The research argues that “often labeled visionaries, artists can serve as ‘seers’ of reality as it is, of what is that others do not see, and of what might be. They thus help frame and envision new cultural mythologies and social imaginaries”12. In terms of foreign policy, art can potentially contribute to strategic narrative: by addressing images, symbols, ideas, and artistic expressions, it can leverage “whose story wins”13.
In terms of conflicting narratives, Russia serves as a prime example. Research suggests that the concept of soft power was incorporated into Russia's official discourse relatively recently; however, soft power as a phenomenon in Moscow’s relations with other actors has a much longer history14. USSR, for instance, created “a narrative of collective identity based on anti-capitalist class markers”, which “was certainly accepted by diverse audiences throughout the world”15. The early 2000s saw a significant, coordinated image-building effort as Moscow projected a narrative of Russia's belonging to the broader European civilization and emphasized its reliability as a business partner16.
To sum up, scholars of Russian foreign policy have often argued that Moscow's understanding of soft power differs from Nye's conceptualization and is more reminiscent of Soviet propaganda or even hard power. For instance, Russia’s 2003 energy strategy defines energy as an ‘instrument for the conduct of internal and external policy’. Culture is defined in almost identical terms – as ‘an instrument to ensure Russia’s economic and foreign policy interests and positive image in the world’17. Research reveals a paradox: Russia's exercise of soft power undermines the conventional understanding that soft power should be based on the universal appeal of liberal values.
Russia's conservative values and illiberal governance models generate admiration and followership, even outside of what Russia claims to be its post-Soviet sphere of influence. Crucially, this admiration and followership serve the traditional function of soft power: generating support for Russia's controversial foreign policy decisions. Admitting that soft power can be based on conservative values is necessary not only to understand Russia's potential in foreign policy but also to recognize the ability of non-Western states to challenge the Western liberal order successfully.18
The research presented in this article aims to understand the reasoning behind the dispositions towards Russian culture among Lithuanian cultural actors and decision-makers. It primarily builds on the theory of vicarious identification developed by Christopher S. Browning, Pertti Joenniemi, and Brent J. Steele19. Vicarious identity involves appropriating another’s identity and experiences as if they were one’s own. Vicarious identification is thus the subject’s attempts to establish and legitimize a vicarious identity20. Vicarious identification can allow individuals to "live through" others, offering a sense of stability and self-esteem, and enhancing what is known as ontological security. Ontological security refers to the ability to maintain a coherent sense of being in the face of existential anxieties. An ontologically secure subject maintains a coherent self-identity narrative, while an ontologically insecure subject struggles with identity continuity, leading to anxiety. Examples of ontological insecurity include feelings experienced by “Remainers” post-Brexit and Democrats after Donald Trump’s election, as well as eco-anxiety related to climate change21. According to Browning et al., vicarious identification can help individuals cope with anxieties related to fate, emptiness, and guilt by providing a basis for self-esteem through others' achievements22.
Current research on the societies of the Baltic countries registers an emergence of a shared identity with Ukraine and waging war with Russia at home23. The Baltic states have demonstrated intense solidarity with Ukraine, providing military aid and humanitarian support, which reflects a shared sense of identity. Lithuania was the first EU country to provide aid to Ukraine, and Baltic leaders have actively pushed for Ukraine’s integration into European and transatlantic communities. In terms of ontological insecurities, both regions share a history of suffering and resistance against Soviet oppression, which has fostered a sense of commonality in their current struggles and has shaped the Baltic states’ identification with Ukraine24.
Vicarious identification with Ukraine has empowered the Baltic states to uphold their established self-narratives about ‘fighting and suffering’ and enhanced their position in the European security establishment.25
The concept of a "decolonizing moment" serves as an overarching interpretative approach. Maria Mälksoo, the author of the concept, argues that: 1) the war in Ukraine has prompted a reevaluation of traditionally undervalued Eastern European perspectives within the context of postcolonial studies; 2) the war exposed persistent thinking patterns of European international relations, which permit to imagine Eastern European states as geopolitical “buffer zone” against Russia; 3) the war is a decolonizing moment of sorts for Central and Easten European states for it provided them with an opportunity to reclaim an active political agency:
a game changer for the Central and East European (CEE) states more generally in their vocal countering of Russia's attempted denial of Ukraine's (and by extension, Russia's former imperial subjugates') sovereign political agency. The emboldened CEE states that have taken a moral and practical lead in supporting Ukraine's cause – and thus also reasserting their own political agency, together with Ukraine's on the battlefield - indicate a novel dynamic in intra-European politics where the tables of who is doing the talking and who is listening are being gradually turned with this war. The increased cultural capital of CEE member states in the European Union will be among the significant political implications for the renewed European polity as it emerges out of this war.26
Dovilė Budrytė relates the "decolonizing moment" to a public discourse that has emerged in Lithuania, linking Russian culture to expansionism, with calls for a moral stance against all expressions of Russian culture. The scholar notes that vicarious identification with Ukraine in the Baltic states has been linked to a broader ‘anti-colonial nationalist politics of memory’, leading to the removal of Soviet-era monuments and a reevaluation of Russian cultural influence. While there is strong support from ethnic majorities for these changes, vulnerabilities among Russian-speaking minorities have also been exposed, highlighting internal divisions within Baltic societies27.
The Old Vilnius Theatre is a case in point for understanding the complex effects of vicarious identification and decolonizing attitudes. The name of the institution was changed from the Russian Drama Theatre to the Old Vilnius Theatre in 2022. Arguably, the war in Ukraine has triggered the memory of Soviet occupation, and the institution, founded in 1946, was remembered as an instrument of colonial power28. After the change in management, the Old Vilnius Theatre removed most of the productions based on Russian playwriting. Local media criticized the remaining productions29.
Developments at the Old Vilnius Theatre grounded the rationale of this research. The research employed a mixed-methods approach to capture both the measurable patterns and the nuanced perspectives of artistic directors working in national and state drama theatres on the dissemination of Russian culture. By integrating quantitative and qualitative elements, the study aimed to generate a more comprehensive understanding of institutional practices, professional experiences, and perceived opportunities within the Lithuanian theatre sector.
Data were collected through a purpose-designed survey administered to artistic directors. The instrument combined closed questions, which allowed for structured comparison across responses, with open-ended questions that enabled respondents to articulate their experiences, viewpoints, and concerns in their own words. The survey was divided into four sections. The first section gathered basic general information (2 questions) necessary for contextualizing responses. The second section addressed the professional experience of the artistic directors (2 questions), focusing on factors that may shape managerial or artistic decision-making. The third and most extensive section consisted of 12 questions exploring respondents' attitudes, perceived constraints, and possibilities associated with current theatre practices and institutional frameworks. Finally, an open comments section (one question) offered respondents the opportunity to provide additional perspectives not covered elsewhere in the instrument (see Annex n° 1).
The system of Lithuanian national and state drama theatre includes two national and seven state theatres. The majority of these theatres are located in the capital, Vilnius; the rest are distributed throughout the country, creating a fairly complete decentralization and accessibility of theatre culture in the country, with roughly 2.8 million inhabitants. The opera and musical theatre, as well as city theatres, independent or private theatres, were not included in this research.
The artistic director is a standard position, equivalent to that of a deputy general manager, responsible for the creative output of the theatre. At the time of the research, most theatres had this position filled, except for one theatre, which does not employ an artistic director, and another that had undergone a change in management, and the position was currently vacant. In those cases, the survey questionnaire was sent to the general manager. Alternatively, two theatres had the responsibilities of an artistic manager divided among several people. In this case, the survey questionnaire was sent to the person responsible for the drama productions.
The survey was conducted during March and April 2025. All national drama theatres participated (2 out of 2), resulting in complete representation at the national level. Among state theatres, five of the seven invited institutions responded, yielding a high participation rate and ensuring that the findings could be interpreted as broadly reflective of the state-level landscape.
Research ethics were rigorously observed throughout the process. No personal or sensitive data were collected, and the survey was designed to prevent the identification of individual respondents. Participation was voluntary, anonymity was thoroughly respected, and all data were handled in accordance with responsible research standards. These measures ensured that respondents could answer freely and confidently, thereby strengthening the reliability and integrity of the findings.
Here are the main findings of this survey.
- Knowledge of Russian culture and theatre, and compatibility of Russian culture with the tendencies of theatres
The survey results suggest that most respondents feel moderately confident in their understanding of Russian culture and theatre, describing their knowledge as either average or good, with only one individual reporting excellent familiarity. However, when asked about the compatibility of Russian cultural traditions with the current directions of their own theatres, the majority viewed them as incompatible or were unsure. Many attributed this distance to the present political climate and an intentional move away from Russian cultural narratives, indicating a broader hesitation to integrate these influences into contemporary theatrical practice.
- The importance of Russian culture in Lithuanian theatre
The respondents generally expressed that promoting Russian culture within Lithuanian theatre is not a priority. Many highlighted concerns about an already high saturation of Russian cultural influences, as well as the political sensitivities surrounding Russia’s current global position. Several also emphasized the importance of focusing on local Lithuanian stories or broader European cultural narratives instead, suggesting a desire to cultivate a more diverse and contextually relevant theatrical landscape.
- Current and past repertoire
The data indicate that Russian plays have historically been a part of every theatre’s repertoire, reflecting their long-standing presence in the cultural landscape. While some theatres continue to include Russian works in their current programming, many have moved away from them, suggesting a shift in artistic direction or cultural priorities. Productions led by Russian directors are now rare, underscoring a broader trend of reduced engagement with Russian theatrical creators in the present repertoire.
- Motivations for including Russian plays
The responses reveal a divide in how theatres approach the inclusion of Russian plays today. Some remain open to staging them when there is clear artistic value, strong audience interest, or opportunities for meaningful international collaboration. For these respondents, quality and cultural exchange can outweigh broader political concerns. However, others reject the idea altogether, emphasizing ideological objections or discomfort with the current political climate. For them, distancing from Russian cultural products is a deliberate stance, reflecting both ethical considerations and a desire to align their repertoire with contemporary sociopolitical realities.
- Reasons against inclusion
The primary reasons for avoiding the inclusion of Russian works center on the current political landscape, with Russia's war in Ukraine being a major point of concern. Many respondents worry that staging Russian material could provoke adverse reactions from audiences, who may view such choices as insensitive or politically charged. Ethical considerations also play a significant role, as some feel that promoting Russian culture at this moment could be seen as indirectly supporting or normalizing the actions of the Russian state. Collectively, these factors create a climate in which many theatres prefer to distance themselves from Russian cultural content.
- Interest in collaboration with Russian artists and in international cultural projects involving Russia
The data indicate an apparent reluctance to engage with Russian artists or Russian-related cultural initiatives at present. Most theatres expressed no interest in collaborating with Russian artists, often due to political and ethical concerns. Only one theatre indicated a conditional openness, suggesting that collaboration might be possible if the circumstances – such as the specific artists involved, their personal positions, or the project’s aims – aligned with their values. A similar pattern emerges in attitudes toward international cultural projects involving Russia, with the majority rejecting the idea outright. At the same time, one respondent noted that their participation would depend heavily on the project's context and the partners involved. Overall, the responses reflect a cautious and largely resistant stance toward cultural engagement with Russia under current conditions.
- Audience interest in productions related to Russian culture
The respondents generally perceive audience interest in productions connected to Russian culture as low to moderate, suggesting that such works are unlikely to draw significant public attention at the moment. Most theatres reported receiving no direct requests from either audiences or sponsors to include Russian-related material in their programming. Only one theatre noted having received some audience feedback on this topic; however, overall, external demand appears to be minimal, reinforcing the broader trend of reduced engagement with Russian cultural content.
- Additional comments
The additional comments highlight a nuanced effort to distinguish “Russian culture” from the actions of the Russian state, with several respondents stressing that cultural heritage and political authority should not be conflated. At the same time, many expressed a clear desire to move away from the historical dependence on Russian cultural influence that has shaped Lithuanian theatre in the past, advocating instead for broader and more diverse artistic perspectives. Ethical concerns remain central: given the current geopolitical tensions, particularly Russia’s war in Ukraine, respondents feel a responsibility to reassess the cultural messages they endorse and to act in solidarity with affected communities.
In conclusion, the research reveals a clear and deliberate shift within Lithuanian theatre institutions – a shift not rooted in unfamiliarity with Russian culture or a historical absence of engagement, but in a conscious reassessment of cultural responsibility under current geopolitical conditions. Answering the research question, one can argue that the artistic managers of national and state drama theatres demonstrate a well-informed awareness of Russian cultural traditions, and many have worked with Russian repertoire or artists in the past. However, this prior engagement has not translated into continued interest. Instead, respondents articulate a purposeful disengagement, framed as an ethical and political stance rather than an artistic one.
This pattern strongly supports the thesis of a decolonizing moment within Lithuanian theatre. For decades, Russian cultural influence occupied a considerable space in Lithuanian artistic life. The present distancing is therefore not simply reactive but also reconstructive: a move toward redefining cultural priorities, expanding theatrical identity beyond historical dependencies, and affirming Lithuanian and European narratives as central points of reference. The responses consistently signal a desire to recalibrate cultural alignments and interrogate inherited hierarchies, indicating that this moment is part of a broader cultural reorientation rather than a temporary or symbolic gesture.
A striking feature of the findings is the extent to which theatres situate their decisions within larger political and moral frameworks. The war in Ukraine appears as a fundamental lens through which artistic managers interpret the ethics of cultural exchange. The association between theatre and political context is therefore deeply embedded: institutions view their repertoires not as neutral aesthetic choices but as actions with ideological implications. The heightened awareness suggests that theatres perceive themselves as a form of soft power, participating in public discourse and moral positioning, especially during times of crisis.
The near-universal reference to the war also underscores a strong sense of vicarious identification with Ukraine. Respondents' language – expressing solidarity, ethical concern, and caution about public reception – suggests that theatres view their cultural decisions as part of a broader collective stance against aggression and in support of the Ukrainian people. This identification appears both emotional and political, shaping institutional behavior in tangible ways: avoiding Russian cultural content, rejecting collaborations, and redefining priorities.
In conclusion, the research reveals a theatre landscape in Lithuania that is actively renegotiating its cultural alignments. The disengagement from the dissemination of Russian culture is neither reactionary nor superficial; it reflects a conscious ethical position shaped by geopolitical realities, a desire to break from historical patterns of dependency, and a commitment to aligning artistic practices with broader social values. This moment reflects a significant transformation – one that redefines how Lithuanian theatre understands its cultural identity, its political responsibilities, and its place within a changing regional context.
Annex n° 1
Questionnaire for the Artistic Director of a Drama Theatre
Dear Madam or Sir, this questionnaire is part of a scientific research study. The aim of the study is to determine the prevailing attitude toward the dissemination of Russian culture in Lithuanian theatre institutions today. The questionnaire does not collect personal or institutional data that would allow the identification of the respondent or the theatre they represent. When publishing the study results, the data will be summarized, and after the research is completed, the data will be destroyed.
Thank you for your time and thoughts.
Part 1: General Information
Theatre status (national, state, municipal, private, other):
Part 2: Experience
How do you assess your knowledge of Russian culture and theatre traditions? (Excellent / Good / Average / Poor / Not familiar at all)
Does Russian culture align with the artistic direction of your theatre? (Yes / No / No opinion)
Why or why not?
Part 3: Attitudes and Opportunities
Do you think the dissemination of Russian culture in Lithuanian theatre is important? (Yes / No / No opinion)
Why or why not?
Has your theatre ever staged performances based on Russian plays? (Yes / No)
Are there currently productions based on Russian plays in your theatre’s repertoire? (Yes / No)
Are there currently performances in your theatre’s repertoire created by directors of Russian nationality? (Yes / No)
What reasons would encourage you to include Russian works in your repertoire? (e.g., artistic value, audience interest, international cooperation, funding)
What reasons discourage you from including performances related to Russian culture? (e.g., political context, audience reaction, financial constraints)
Would you be interested in collaborating with Russian directors, playwrights, or actors? (Yes / No / Maybe)
Why or why not?
Would your theatre participate in international cultural exchanges related to Russian theatre? (Yes / No / Depends on conditions)
How do you assess audience interest in performances related to Russian culture? (High / Medium / Low)
Have you received feedback from audiences or sponsors regarding the inclusion of performances related to Russian culture in your theatre’s repertoire? (Yes / No)
Part 4: Additional Comments
Do you have any additional remarks or thoughts about the dissemination of Russian culture in Lithuanian theatre?
Thank you for your answers and insights!
Notes
1Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Cambridge University and Sorbonne Nouvelle University, as well as online.
2“Call to Suspend Cultural Cooperation with Russia and International Presentation of Russian Culture,” Ukrainian Institute, accessed December 6, 2025, https://ui.org.ua/en/news-en/stop-cooperation-with-russia-2/.
3Peter de Caluwe, “Culture as the Cement of Europe | Statement Peter de Caluwe,” La Monnaie / De Munt, accessed December 6, 2025, https://www.lamonnaiedemunt.be/en/magazine/2363-culture-as-the-cement-of-europe.
4“Kultūros ir renginių sektoriui primenamos rekomendacijos nekviesti į Lietuvą Rusijos kūrėjų, išskyrus smerkiančius Putino režimą,” accessed December 6, 2025, https://lrkm.lrv.lt/lt/naujienos/kulturos-ir-renginiu-sektoriui-primenamos-rekomendacijos-nekviesti-i-lietuva-rusijos-kureju-isskyrus-smerkiancius-putino-rezima/.
5Žygimantas Šilobritas, “Kairys: „mentalinis karantinas“ rusiškiems kūriniams būtų naudingas, bet sprendimas lieka įstaigoms,” lrt.lt, January 31, 2023, https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/kultura/12/1879102/kairys-mentalinis-karantinas-rusiskiems-kuriniams-butu-naudingas-bet-sprendimas-lieka-istaigoms.
6Andrew Higgins and Jenny Gross, “A Cultural Casualty of the War in Ukraine: 'The Nutcracker'", in The New York Times, accessed December 6, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/22/world/europe/-nutcracker-lithuania-russia-ukraine.html.
7Joseph Nye, “Soft Power: The Origins and Political Progress of a Concept,” in Palgrave Communications 3, n° 1 17008 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1057/palcomms.2017.8; Hendrik W. Ohnesorge, Soft Power: The Forces of Attraction in International Relations., Global Power Shift (Springer International Publishing, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29922-4.
8Peter S. Henne, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Soft Power,” in International Studies Perspectives 23, n° 1 (2022): 94–111, https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekab007.
9Hendrik W. Ohnesorge, Soft Power: The Forces of Attraction in International Relations. Springer International Publishing (2020), p. 9.
10Peter S. Henne. art. cit.
11Sandra Waddock, “Art, Transformation and the Social Imaginary,” in World Futures 78, n° 7 (2022): 419–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/02604027.2021.2018645.
12Ibid., p. 421.
13Ibid.
14Valentina Feklyunina, “Soft Power and Identity: Russia, Ukraine and the ‘Russian World(s),’” in European Journal of International Relations 22, n° 4 (2016): 773–96, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115601200.
15Ibid., p. 781.
16Valentina Feklyunina, “Russia’s International Images and Its Energy Policy. An Unreliable Supplier?,” in Europe-Asia Studies 64, n° 3 (2012): p. 449–69.
17James Sherr, Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia’s Influence Abroad (Brookings Institution Press, 2013). p. 72.
18Vincent Charles Keating and Katarzyna Kaczmarska, “Conservative Soft Power: Liberal Soft Power Bias and the ‘Hidden’ Attraction of Russia,” in Journal of International Relations and Development 22, n° 1 (2019): p. 1–27, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0100-6.
19Christopher S. Browning et al., Vicarious Identity in International Relations : Self, Security and Status on the Global Stage (Oxford University Press, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197526385.001.0001.
20Ibid., p. 17.
21Ibid., p. 20.
22Ibid. p. 24.
23Dovilė Budrytė, “‘A Decolonising Moment of Sorts’: The Baltic States’ Vicarious Identification with Ukraine and Related Domestic and Foreign Policy Developments” in Central European Journal of International and Security Studies. 17, n° 4 (2023): 82–105, https://doi.org/10.51870/YPIJ8030.
24Ibid.
25Ibid. p. 98.
26Maria Mälksoo, “The Postcolonial Moment in Russia’s War Against Ukraine,” in Journal of Genocide Research 25, n° 3–4 (2023): 472, https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2022.2074947.
27Dovilė Budrytė, art. cit, p. 98-99.
28Ibid.
29Ibid.
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Quelques mots à propos de : Martynas Petrikas
Martynas Petrikas, Dr., is a full professor at the Lithuanian Academy of Music and Theatre, associate professor at Vilnius University (Faculty of Communication), and a research fellow with the Lithuanian Culture Research Institute. His research scope encompasses the history of Lithuanian theatre, with a special emphasis on its political and social implications, as well as the international dimension of its development. M. Petrikas’ key publications are contributions to collective monographs "Post-Soviet Lithuanian Theatre: History, Identity, Memory" (Vilnius Art Academy Press, 2014, in Lithuanian), "Reclaimed Avant-Garde: Spaces and Stages of Avant-Garde Theatre in Central-Eastern Europe“ (Zbigniew Raszewski Theatre Institute, 2018), and “History of Polish Theatre” (Cambridge University Press, 2023).


